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Telecommunication Network Competition: 




The paper analyzes calling party pays access pricing policies in a General Equilibrium 
two ways access charge model with consumers that choose between different 
telecommunication providers, and benefit from making calls to other consumers and 
from the calls that they receive. We obtain that agents’ network decision may leads to 
an inefficient industry structure where from a social point of view the network 
competitively chosen by the agents is an inferior one. Under ad-hoc parameter values 
we obtain that if each telecommunication company faces a fixed cost, becomes of 
higher efficient to finance this cost through a fixed charge on the telephone line, an 
access charge, and setting telecommunication companies interconnection charges equal 
to each company interconnection marginal cost, where policies that finance fixed or 
common costs by increasing interconnection charges lead to less efficient allocations. 
And also we obtain that if the companies have different interconnection marginal cost, 
interconnection charge differences should be transferred to the final consumer prices, 





In network industries such as telecommunication, gas, electricity, water and sewage 
services is possible to identify areas where competition is feasible and desirable, while 
in other areas competition is more difficult do to the natural monopoly characteristics of 
the industry. In the last two decades in many countries utilities regulation change 
direction to recognize those areas where competition is feasible, to incentive the entry of 
new agents, while it keeps regulated tariffs in those areas where competition have been 
less efficient. The telecommunication industry have been one of the most dynamic 
explained by its high growth rates and strong technological innovation, facts that in the 
last years have shake the structure of the industry. 
 
Telephone networks are characterized by strong scale and scope economies,
1 economies 
that added to the network externalities that affect the users of the telecommunication 
service,
2 imply that the established telephone services provider counts with an 
advantage over new entrants. To neutralize this advantage, in many countries regulatory 
policy have made mandatory the networks interconnection, what allows the users to 
contact any other user or services provider independently of the company with which 
they sign up for the telephone service. Notwithstanding, mandatory networks 
                                                 
1 See Cribbet (2000). 
2 See Squire (1973).   3
interconnection will be senseless without appropriate interconnection charges and final 
services prices. 
 
In this paper we analyze interconnection pricing policies in a calling party pays regime 
(CPP), where government subsidies are not available, using a General Equilibrium two 
way interconnection network model with consumers that choose between different 
telecommunication providers, and where the consumers benefit from making calls to 
other consumers and from the calls that they receive. The framework that we consider is 
more flexible than standard Hotelling models of consumer differentiation as developed 
by Armstrong (1998), Laffont, Rey, and Tirole (1998a and b), and inelastic demand 
models where consumers demand one unit of a final good.
3 In the model that we 
develop there is a one to one distinct personal telephone contact between each pair of 
telephone user, relation that may not to be the same within other pairs of telephone 
users. Once a consumer becomes a subscriber of a telecommunication company, the 
company monopolizes the access to this user, and this is an essential input for other 
telecommunication companies to provide a complete final service to all the subscribers. 
Depending on the substitution degree of the services offered by the telecommunication 
companies, capture by a consumers’ loyalty preference parameter, the 
telecommunication companies may or not compete for the same universe of subscribers. 
 
The structure that we analyze resembles today’s telecommunication industry and policy 
challenges confronted by regulatory authorities in many countries where the opening of 
the telecommunication industry to competition have posted some important questions. 
Here we analyze three questions of general concern that largely have been debated in 
Chilean telecommunication industry. First, with prices set according to marginal costs 
and in a free market regime, does the telecommunication company chosen by 
decentralized consumers leads to an efficient development of the industry?
4 Our second 
                                                 
3 The model most frequently used in the literature, developed by Armstrong (1998), Laffont, Rey and 
Tirole (1998a-b), is build upon the Hotelling model, with an infinite number of consumers whose 
preferences are uniformly distributed in the unit interval. In general and in the consumers preference 
parameter space, the model is presented as one where company one offers a variety that correspond to 
point cero and company two offers a variety that correspond to point one, where consumers incur a cost 
from choosing a particular telecommunication provider given by theirs’ and the telecommunication 
company location in the preference parameter space. Each telephone user makes a number of calls that 
depend on prices but are independent on who they call, and each consumer calls are basically uniformly 
distributed within all other users. 
4 This issue is not analyzed in the seminal works of Armstrong (1998) and Laffont, Rey and Tirole 
(1998), where their emphasis is on matters such as if the setting of the access charges could be delegated 
to the operators or if it could be preferable to maintain a regulated approach. In essence they consider a 
case where telecommunication companies freely chooses final consumers prices and in their model the 
inefficiencies rest on the companies’ strategic or monopolistic pricing behavior. Basically they find that 
freely negotiated access charges can have adverse effects on competition, for example in the mature 
phase of the industry allowing collusion and a price mark-up above cost, and also as an entry barrier for 
new comers. On a different edge, in the General Equilibrium framework that we use the emphasis is on   4
question looks at the optimality of recovering fixed or common costs using a fixed 
component in a two part tariff pricing policy regime instead of scaling the access 
charges above marginal costs to account for the fixed or common costs, and evaluate the 
efficiency of pricing policies where the financing of these costs is by setting a fixed 
entry charge for the telephone line; or setting telecommunication companies 
interconnection charges equal to the interconnection marginal cost of the company with 
the lowest interconnection marginal cost; or setting the telecommunication companies 
interconnection charges equal to the interconnection marginal cost of the company with 
the largest interconnection marginal cost?
5 And third, if the companies have different 
interconnection marginal cost that are reflected in the companies interconnection 




To answer these questions we analyze the equilibrium properties of the General 
Equilibrium CPP two way access charge model and also perform some numerical 
experiments on it. With respect to our first question, we obtain that there is no guarantee 
that the network chosen by decentralized agents leads to an efficient development of the 
industry. Basically, the lack of coordination between the agents can lead to an 
inefficient development of the industry.
7 Further, within our CPP regime higher 
efficiency is not necessarily guarantee by having the consumers choosing the network 
with the lowest termination cost,
8 and it depends on the alignment of social and private 
incentives in terms of the final prices faced by the consumers, what relies on the cost of 
                                                                                                                                               
modeling consumers’ choices, in terms of their calls patterns and network choices, where a large number 
of potential telephone companies can freely enter the market. 
5 Our findings complement Armstrong (1998), Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998) work’s, where they 
analyze a symmetric model that under linear tariffs the Ramsey solution is to set the final consumers 
price equal to the variable cost plus the final subscriber fixed connection cost, and the access charge 
should be set equal to the marginal cost of access; and under non linear tariffs the usage prices is equal to 
the marginal cost and the fixed fee should be set equal to the final subscriber fixed connection cost, and 
the access charge should be set equal to the marginal cost of access. Also, Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998) 
obtain that free price discrimination between on-net and off-net calls improves welfare respect to case 
where the telecommunication companies charge a symmetric free price for on-net and off-net calls. 
6 Carter and Wright (2003) with asymmetric networks, look at a different problem. They analyze the 
strategic incentives of the smaller and the larger network to ask for symmetric or asymmetric access 
charges; and Peitz (2004), in a liberalized telecommunication market, show that asymmetric access price 
regulation with a cost based access price regulation for the incumbent and an access markup for the 
entrant is more successful than cost-based access markup for the entrant and the incumbent  what is done 
to provide strength for the entrant until it can compete on an equal basis with the incumbent.. 
7 For the economics of networks competition see Liebowitz and Margolis (1994 and 1998), Kats and 
Shapiro (1985 and 1994), and Besen and Farrel (1994). 
8 For example, Armstrong (2002) in a non linear pricing regime obtains for the first best outcome that 
prices should be set to attract more subscribers onto the network with the lower termination cost.   5
initiating and finishing a call in each and within networks. With respect to the second 
question we obtain that is more efficient the financing of telecommunication companies 
fixed cost with a fixed charge per line, setting the prices for telephone calls at their 
marginal cost, instead of collecting part of the required revenues by increasing the 
companies termination charge above marginal cost. Finally, on the third question we 
obtain that is more efficient to have discriminatory pricing for on-net and off-net calls 
based on cost differences, where a reciprocal or symmetric interconnection charge 
policy where companies interconnection charges are equalized to the termination cost of 
the company with the largest or smallest termination cost leads to less efficient resource 
allocations. 
 
In section two we describe the general equilibrium two way interconnection network 
model with heterogeneous agents. In section three we analyze the three questions 
posted. And finally in section five we give the main conclusions of the paper. 
 
2.- The model  
 
There are M price taker potential companies or interconnected telephone networks, j = 
1,…,M, where each monopolizes the access to its subscribers. If the network 
infrastructure of two or more companies is symmetric or overlapped (according to a 
consumers’ loyalty preference parameter) the companies will compete for the same 
universe of subscribers, supplying services that in the extreme can be perfect 
substitutes. To happen a situation like this is required for the networks to share the same 
effective coverage area as well as that the supplied service is identical (this mean that 
the users must perceive the service offered by each company as identical or as close 
substitutes). If the network infrastructure of two or more companies is asymmetric or 
not overlapped, the companies do not compete for the same universe of subscribers, 
what can happen in a case where the companies provide a different service (not a 
perfect substitute of each other) or provide telecommunication services to users located 
in different geographic areas (capture in our model by the consumers loyalty preference 
parameter that have an equivalent role to the Armstrong (1998) and Laffont, Rey and 
Tirole (1998) travel cost parameter used in the Hotelling model). From the consumers 
perspective, if the companies’ network infrastructure is symmetric or asymmetric 
depends on network infrastructure location, technology, pricing policies, as well as 




There are N potential consumers, i = 1,…,N, who are price takers and take as given 
other agents decisions. If a consumer contracts the telecommunication service with a 
telecommunication company, she/he obtains utility from the calls made to other 
subscribers, from the calls received from other subscribers,
9 and from the consumption 
                                                 
9 The presence of the call externality is an important aspect of the telecommunication industry, where 
some agents have a telephone mostly to receive calls and not to make calls. Jeon, Laffont and Tirole 
(2004), Berger (2002) and Peitz (2004) extend standard Hotelling model to account for the externality of   6
of a basic good that represents all the other goods available in the economy, whose price 
is normalized to one. Since there are M potential companies, each consumer can choose 
among M+1 potential locations (not being a member of a company considered). 
 
Since there are N potential consumers and M+1 potential locations for each consumer 
within the different companies (set j = 0 for not being a member of any network), we 
have that there are (M+1)
N possible arrays of the N consumers in the M different 
companies (not being a member of a telecommunication company considered). 
However, M×N of the last arrays are trivial because are cases where only one agent is 
subscriber of a telephone company and the others are not. Thus, the number of 
significant arrays to be considered are T = (M+1)
N − M×N.  Lets’ index by t each of the 
significant arrays where each of the consumers belong to one of the networks (not being 
a member of a telecommunication company considered), then t = 1,…, T. 
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where ( ) 0
i vt≥  is a loyalty preference network parameter that weights consumer utility 
from being in network j,  j = 0,…,M, if network j is the network where agent i is 
appointed in array t. Notice that  ( ) 0
i vt=  when j = 0 and agent i is not appointed to any 
telecommunication network in array t.  ()
i
s Ctare calls made by consumer i, who is a 
subscriber of network j in array t, to consumer s, who is a subscriber of network r in 




i Ct are calls made by consumer s, who is a subscriber of network r in 
array t, to consumer i, who is a subscriber of network j in array t. 
i
s φ  is a preference 
parameter, 0 ≤ 
i
s φ  ≤ 1, that accounts for the relative value that consumer i gives to the 
calls that she/he makes to consumer s against the calls that she/he receives from 
consumer s, it weights  ()
i




i Ct  or the externality for agent i to receive a call 
from agent s. 
is β ≥ 0 is consumer’ i preference parameter that value the utility from the 
calls made and received from consumer s, s = 1,…M, s ≠ i, it picks up the fact that each 
consumer benefits from contacts with a reduced number of other consumers and not 
necessarily with all the other agents that has a telephone.
10 g
i is the marginal utility of 
                                                                                                                                               
receiving a call. They found that efficiency points to set access charges below marginal cost or to adopt a 
termination discount. 
10 For example in Armstrong (1998), and Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998), each consumers calls distribute 
uniformly within all the other consumers with a telephone.   7
income and  ( )
i Yt is agent i consumption of other goods different to telecommunication 
services in array t.
11 
 
Let  [ ] () 0 , 1
i It ∈ , j=0,1,…,M, be a function that gives the chances by which agent i 








= ∑ . Also for agent i let  []
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= ∑ ,be a function 
that gives the chances expected by agent i that agent s chooses array t. As a result, 
accounting for consumers’ network choices, consumer i ex-ante preferences are 
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Thus, for preferences defined over all these goods, consumer i choice variables are 
{} { } 1, 1
() , () , ()
T N ii i
s ss i t
Ct YtIt
=≠ =
, where the consumer chooses (N+1)×T variables.  
 
Let P
jr(t) be the price for a consumer to initiate a call in network of company j and to 
end a call in the network of company r in array t, and let T
j(t) be the fixed charge paid 
by a consumer from having a telephone of company j in array t. Thus, given prices, 
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where  m
i is the consumer’s i endowment of the basic good, ρ
ij is consumer’s i 
ownership share of firm j and π 
j (t) are firm j profits under array t, 0 ≤ ρ 








1 ρ . 
 
Given the consumer network choice I
i(t), we have a well defined twice differentiable 
concave optimization problem over a compact and convex set, problem that has a 
                                                 
11 For computational convenience we use a logarithmic utility function where depending on
i
s φ , 
i
s C  and 
_
s
i C can perfectly substitute for each other. Also, the assumption that the weighting parameter that 
multiply 
i
s C  and 
_
s
i C add up to one,
i
s φ  and (1- 
i
s φ ), can be relaxed.   8
unique solution.
12 Thus, the solution of the consumer optimization problem is given by 
the choice, if any, of being a client of one of the telecommunication companies where 
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i t λ  is the Lagrange multiplier under array t, and is equal to the marginal utility 
of income 
i g . Thus, in an interior solution when  ( )
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Thus, if the price that pays consumer i who is in network j to call consumer s who is in 
network r increases, then the number of calls that consumer i makes to consumer s will 
diminish. If the number of calls that consumer s makes to consumer i increases, then 
diminishes the number of calls that consumer i makes to consumer s. If the loyalty 
preference network parameter  ( )
i vt that weights consumer i utility from being in 
network j under array t increases, calls from consumer i who is in network j to consumer 
s who is in network r increases. If the marginal utility of income increases, then calls 
from consumer i to consumer s decreases. If 
i
s φ  increases, the preference parameter that 
accounts for the relative significance of  ( )
i
s Ct  and  ()
_
s
i Ct , then calls from agent i to 
agent s increases. And finally, if the preference parameter 
is β that value consumer i 
utility from having a contact with consumer s increases, calls from consumer i who is in 
network j to consumer s who is in network r increases. 
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+− ≤ ∑ , then as a solution we take that the consumer makes no calls and only 
for that cases we set 
1
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M
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Given consumers’ call patterns we can obtain the demand for traffic for on-net and off-
net calls for each telecommunication network by summing up the calls of the different 
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and in equilibrium is equal to supply Q
jr(t). Also, access demand or the number of 
subscribers of company j network in array t are ( )
j Nt , and in equilibrium is equal to 
access supply. 
 
2.2.- Technology, Costs, and Profits 
 
Let ( )
jo p t  (( )
je p t ) be the price charged by company j for initiating (ending) a call in 
his network under array t. Let 
jo c  (
je c ) be the cost to initiate (end) a call in network j, 
let 
j C  be network j fixed cost, and let  ( )
jr Qt be the traffic supply from network j to 
network  r in array t, and  ( )
j Nt  network j subscribers in array t. Then, in array t 
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and company j total revenues are 
 
11
() () () () () () () () ()
MM
jj j j j j r j r j e r j j j
rr
rj rj
R t P tQ t P tQ t p tQ t T tN t
==
≠≠
=+ + + ∑∑ . 
 
Given prices, company j total profits and optimization problem in array t is: 
 
{} 1 () , () , () , ()
() () ()


















We assume that individuals know all the prices and know when they call a subscriber of 
network j or of network r.
13 Also, network interconnection is mandatory within the 
                                                 
13 In practice this assumption of complete knowledge can be implemented with the existence of a digit 
that identifies the network that is being called, or that during the call the calling party hear a different tone   10
different companies that serve the industry, and companies have a mandatory service 
obligation as long as they incur no losses, and the interconnection charges and final 
service prices are taken as given by the companies. 
 
A General Equilibrium for this model is a consumption plan for each consumer, 
{} { } 1, 1
() , () , ()
T N ii i
s ss i t
Ct YtIt
=≠ =
,  i = 1,…,N, a production plan for each company, 
{} 1 () , () , () , ()
M jj jr rj j
r
rj





,  j = 1,…,M, t = 1,…, T, and a price vector, 
{ } 1,...,
1,...,
() , () , () , ()





, t = 1,…,T, such that at the given prices, and given 
other agents consumption plan, each consumer consumption plan maximizes utility; at 
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in array t the number of subscribers in company j equals supply ( )
j Nt , j=1,…,M, t = 
1,…,T. Also in the definition we should note that implicitly we assume that equilibrium 
in the intermediate service or access service market exists. 
 
The sequence of the events in the model is that in the first stage the consumers choose a 
network, that defines an array t, and then in the second stage they choose the number of 
calls that they place in the system. As is set the model an Equilibrium in the can be 
obtained by backward solving. In the second stage within array t, with Brower fixed 
point theorem, and when prices are properly work out, the existence of equilibrium can 
be established. However in the first stage and given the nature of the consumers’ 
network choice, when consumers’ network choices are endogenously determined, the 
existence of equilibrium can not be guaranteed for a setting where consumers use pure 
strategies, and it only can be guarantee when they randomly choose a network, 
[]
1




It t T It
=
∈= = ∑ . It should be view that given array t, the consumers 
behave competitively with respect to the number of calls that they place to each other in 
the network, but is in terms of the consumers’ telecommunication network decision, if 
any, that we have a game whose solution is given as Nash equilibrium.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
in the auricular, or that the subscribers are or not able to decide if their telephone is or not able to 
communicate other companies networks as occurs in some countries regarding the possibility to block 
calls to certain telephone numbers.     11
When consumers’ network choices are taken as given,
14 we look for a Competitive 
Equilibrium in the consumers’ decision in terms of the traffic that they place in the 
network. For it Walras Law can be confirmed from consumers budget constrain. Given 
array t and for price taking agents, it can be established a continuous correspondence for 
prices { } 1,...,
1,...,
() , () , () , ()





 in a compact and convex set, what proves the 
existence of a Walrasian Equilibrium. 
 
In array t and after consumers’ network choices are given, from a consumer point of 
view T
j can be seen as a lump-sum transfer to the telecommunication company, so 
given  { } 1,...,
1,...,






 the consumers’ decision is restricted to choose the 
number of calls she/he will place to any other consumer. With 
{ } 1,...,
1,...,






 being set at their marginal cost and setting the lump sum 
transfer ( ) / ( )
jj j Tt C Nt = , j = 1,…,M, we can compute the equilibrium for price taking 
agents given array t, t = 1,…,T. Also, notice that under array t, the efficiency of the 
equilibrium will depend on the existence of call externalities, where if 
i
s φ =1, i, s = 1,…, 
N, the equilibrium is efficient and satisfy the 1
rst Welfare Theorem (where the fixed 
charge T
j, j = 1,…,N, should be seen as a lump-sum transfer that allows the companies 
to recover their fixed cost). 
 
Next, in the first stage the consumers decide on which network, if any, each of them 
will contract telecommunication services, what stands up for a game where consumers 
strategically choose between the different networks, game whose solution is a Nash 
Equilibrium. Thus, given second stages Competitive Equilibrium, within each array t, t 
= 1,…,T, to obtain an Equilibrium in the first stage, we can construct a continuous 




= , i = 1,…,N, in a compact and 
convex set, where Kakutani fixed point theorem assures that there is a Nash 
equilibrium. As happen for any finite game, the existence of the equilibrium can only be 
guaranteed if the consumers randomly choose between the different networks as well it 
happen that the equilibrium may be not unique. 
 
To address the questions announced in the introduction, in what follows we will 
numerically compute Nash equilibrium in a simplified case where there are four 
potential subscribers, that play pure strategies in terms of network choice, and free entry 




The interconnection to network j is an essential input to complete a telephone call 
originated in network r or alternatively is an essential input so that the business owner 
                                                 
14 Notice that there are T possible arrays of the N consumers in the M different companies and not being a 
member of a telecommunication company considered.   12
of network r can sell services to network j subscribers. With the increasing degrees of 
competition in world wide telecommunication industry, regulators face fundamental 
questions about competition, efficiency and price regulation of the telecommunication 
industry. With the two way general equilibrium interconnection network model we 
bring in answers to questions as: first, in a situation where companies can freely enter 
the industry, consumers network choice will lead to an optimal development of the 
industry?; second, if telecommunication companies confront a fixed or common cost, 
what price adjustment gives larger social welfare, to set a fixed entry charge for the 
telephone line, to set telecommunication companies interconnection charges equal to the 
interconnection marginal cost of the company with the lowest interconnection marginal 
cost, or to set the telecommunication companies interconnection charges equal to the 
interconnection marginal cost of the company with the largest interconnection marginal 
cost; and third, when the regulator calculates termination or interconnection charges into 
the different telecommunication networks, the interconnection charges should be 
symmetric or asymmetric for the different networks?, and if they are asymmetric, what 
are the effects that the differences in interconnection charges are or not transfer to the 
public or final user?  
 
In what follows and to address these important questions we perform three numerical 
experiments using the CPP General Equilibrium two way interconnection network 
model just developed: 
 
Experiment 1.- Optimal network selection 
Experiment 2.- Tariff adjustment 
Experiment 3.- Interconnection charge differences transferred to the public 
 
For the experiments we assume 
N
ij 1
= ρ , for all (i,j) pair in N×M, and that consumer i 
preference parameter that value the utility from the calls made and received from 
consumer s is 
is β = 1, i, s = 1,…M, s ≠ i. 
 
3.1.- Experiment 1.- Optimal network selection 
 
The question is if decentralized telecommunication company selection by price taker 
consumers in a competitive environment where companies freely choose to enter or not 
the industry lead to an efficient development of the telecommunication industry?  
 
Before we address the above question we already notice that within array t and as long 
as φ
s
i < 1 for at least one (s,i) ∈N×N, Competitive Equilibrium may not be efficient 
when the prices faced by the consumers differ from the social marginal benefit (SMgB) 
of calling each other. As a fact of the externality that a consumer has when she/he 
receives a call from other consumer, we have that the social marginal benefit of a call 
made from consumer i in network j to consumer s in network r in array t is:
15 
 
                                                 
15 This is beyond the tariff mediated network externality.   13
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Given network choices, to have that consumer i makes a socially efficient number of 
calls to consumer s is needed that the social marginal benefit of a call from consumer i 
in network j to consumer s in network r is equal to the social marginal cost (SMgC) of 
that call, that in our model is c
jo + c
re. Thus, if consumer i pays a price to call consumer 
s that is equal to the SMgC, it will be that the number of calls that consumer i makes to 
consumer s is below what is socially optimum. 
 
Beyond the last inefficiency due to the externality from receiving a call, and even if φ
i
s 
= 1 for all (s,i) pair,
16 the question is if consumers’ network choice, with prices adjusted 
to costs, will lead to an efficient choice of the network in the industry?  
 
From standard game theory we have that Nash Equilibrium may be not unique and by 
the lack of coordination it may not be Pareto Optimum. As it happens in a Prisoner’s 
Dilemma, when the agents independently and without coordination choose, if any, a 
network may conduct in the first stage of the model to an inefficient resource allocation. 
Choosing ad-hoc parameter values set we illustrate an awful outcome in our model. For 
that, first we compute a model equilibrium where the consumers are free to choose if 
they contract telecommunication services with company 1 or company 2, and then 
compute a market equilibrium where we restrict the consumers only to become 
subscribers of company 1, and after that we compare the efficiency properties of both 
equilibrium. 
 
Table 1.1 present the preference, income, and cost parameter values set that we 
particularly choose to perform the numerical experiment. From consumer preference 
and income parameter values we can appreciate that consumers are homogeneous, and 
also that in terms of their preference parameter values they perceive network 1 as a 
perfect substitute for network 2. Further, since φ
i
j = 1, i, j = 1,…,N, the consumers only 
receive utility from the calls that they made but receive no utility from the calls that they 
receive. In terms of the cost structure, while even there is no fixed or common cost in 
any network, C
1 = C
2 = 0, we have that network 2 is more efficient in the cost of 
originating a call than network 1, while network 1 is more efficient in the cost of 







Experiment 1.- Technology and Preference Parameters 
Technology Preferences 
c
1o  0.003  Consumer  1 2 3 4 
c
1e 0.002  v
i1  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
c
2o 0.002  v
i2  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
c
2e 0.008  g
i  0.300 0.300 0.300 0.300 
C
1 0.000  m
i  10.000 10.000 10.000 10.000 
C
2 0.000    φ
1
2  1.000  φ
2
1  1.000  φ
3
1  1.000  φ
4
1  1.000 
     φ
1
3  1.000  φ
2
3  1.000  φ
3
2  1.000  φ
4
2  1.000 
     φ
1
4  1.000  φ
2
4  1.000  φ
3
4  1.000  φ
4
3  1.000 
                                                 
16 Case where the externality from incoming calls does not apply.   14
 
Table 1.2 show the prices that we use for the experiment, where they have been set 
equal to marginal costs (MgC). From the table we see that is cheaper to call within 
network 1 than within network 2, and is cheaper to call from network 1 to network 2 
than from network 2 to network 1, and that network 1 has lower termination or 




Experiment 1.- Prices 
    
P
11 0,0050  =  MgC 
P
12 0,0011  =  MgC 
P
22 0,0100  =  MgC 
P
21 0,0040  =  MgC 
p
1o 0,0030  =  MgC 
p
1e 0,0020  =  MgC 
p
2o 0,0020  =  MgC 
p
2e 0,0080  =  MgC 
T
1 0,0000   
T
2 0,0000   
 
For Table 1.1 parameter values and Table 1.2 prices in Table 1.3 we show the computed 
model equilibrium on key variables when the consumers freely choose between being 
subscribers of company 1 or between being subscribers of company 2 
 
Table 1.3 
Experiment 1.- Outcome – Consumers freely choose being subscribers of company 1 or 2 










12  1  I
22  1  I
32  1  I
42  1  π









1 332.3333  π




















Network traffic  Surplus 
Q
11 0.0000 Q
22 3988.0000  Producer  surplus  0.0000 
Q
12 0.0000 Q
21 0.0000  Consumer  Surplus  232.4857 
 Social  Welfare  232.4857 
 
Is obtained that the consumers freely choose to become subscribers of company 2, 
showing symmetric call patterns within them. In this situation, company 1 is out of the 
market, company 2 profits are cero, where each consumer makes 332 calls to each 
other, and consumer surplus and Social Welfare reaches 232.4857 (measured in 
monetary units). In Table 1.4 we compute the equilibrium for the case where the 
consumers are offered the chance only to become members of network 1, what is 
achieved in the model by setting a huge fixed cost to become subscriber of company 2 
that in practice makes that all the consumers freely choose, if any, to become 
subscribers of company 1. If the huge fixed cost is suppressed we have that consumers 
rather move to company 2. In the equilibrium outcome of Table 1.4 the consumers also 
show symmetric call patterns within them. Comparing Consumer Surplus and Social 
Welfare within Table 1.3 and Table 1.4 we have that when the consumers are restricted 
only to become subscribers of company 1 Consumers Surplus and Social Welfare 
increases respect to the case where the consumers are free to choose to become   15
subscribers of company 1 or company 2. In Table 1.4 company 2 is out of the market 
and company 1 serves all market demand and Social Welfare reaches 260.1516. Thus in 
the case where consumers are restricted only to become members of network 1, Social 
Welfare increases. This result shows that in a competitive market with prices adjusted to 
costs where consumers freely choose with whom they subscribe the telecommunication 
service, and where telecommunication companies can freely enter the market, there is 





Experiment 1.- Outcome – Consumers are offered the chance only to become members of network 1 










12  0  I
22  0  I
32  0  I
42  0  π
1  0.0000 
C
1






1 665.6667  π
2  0.0000 
C
1

















Network traffic  Surplus 
Q
11 7988.0000 Q
22 0.0000  Producer  surplus  0.0000 
Q
12 0.0000 Q
21 0.0000  Consumer  Surplus  260.1516 
 Social  Welfare  260.1516 
 
But, why when the consumers can freely choose if they want to become subscribers of 
company 1 or company 2 we can not guarantee an efficient resource allocation? 
 
With preference parameter values as in Table 1.1, we have that for the consumers 
company 1 network is a perfect substitute for company 2 network. But even thought 
prices have been set equal to marginal costs, we have that when consumers are free to 
choose if they want to contract telecommunication service with company 1 or company 
2, consumers’ incentives are not aligned with social incentives, an leads consumers to 
subscribe to a company that dictate to an inefficient development of the 
telecommunication industry. In the particular case analyzed, is cheaper to make calls 
within network 1 than within network 2 (P
11 < P
22), and is cheaper to call from network 
1 to network 2 than from network 2 to network 1 (P
12 < P
21). With this, we should 
expect the consumers to contract telecommunication service with company 1. But if we 
expect that, someone can free ride on the other agents decision by contracting the 
telecommunication service with company 2 and getting by that a cheaper price to call 
the others that are expected to be in company 1 (P
21 < P
11 < P
22). However, we will 
have that all end behaving in the same manner and contracting telecommunication 
services with company 2 what at last leads to an inefficient resource allocation. Thus, 
while social incentive is to contract telecommunication services with company 1, 
individually by the lack of coordination the incentive is to contract telecommunication 
services with company 2, meaning that social and private incentives go in different 
directions and that leads to an inefficient resource allocation. The preceding happen 
even there is no externality from receiving a call. Basically, we have a Prisoner’s 
Dilemma in the network choice game. 
 
                                                 
17 Liebowitz and Margolis, (1998).   16
Call taste parameters 
 
How different taste parameters to call or being called affect market equilibrium. Instead 
of using taste parameters φ
i
j = 1, i, j = 1,…,N, as in Table 1.1, in Table 1.5 we compute 
model equilibrium using taste parameters φ
i
j = 0,01, i,  j = 1,…,N. Again, all the 
consumers become subscribers of company 2, where Social Welfare reaches 159.0142. 
Even though in the equilibrium a pattern of differentiated calls can emerge within the 
subscribers, where for the computed equilibrium consumer 1 free rides on consumers 2 
to 4 incoming calls, consumer 2 free rides on consumers 3 and 4 incoming calls, and 
consumer 3 free rides on consumer 4 incoming calls. 
 
Table 1.5 
Experiment 1.- Outcome – Taste call preferences 










12  1  I
22  1  I
32  1  I
42  1  π





1 233.3333  C
3
1 233.3333  C
4
1 233.3333  π
2  0.0000 
C
1
3 000.000  C
2
3 000.000  C
3





4 000.000  C
2
4 000.000  C
3




Network traffic  Surplus 
Q
11 0000.000 Q
22 1,400.000  Producer  surplus  0.0000 
Q
12 0000.000 Q
21 0000.000  Consumer  Surplus  159.0142 
 Social  Welfare  159.0142 
 
Table 1.6 
Experiment 1.- Outcome – Taste call preferences when consumers are offered the chance only to become 
members of network 1 










12  0  I
22  0  I
32  0  I
42  0  π





1 566.6667  C
3
1 566.6667  C
4
1 566.6667  π
2  0.0000 
C
1
3 000.000  C
2
3 000.000  C
3





4 000.000  C
2
4 000.000  C
3




Network traffic  Surplus 
Q
11 3,400.000 Q
22 0000.000  Producer  surplus  0.0000 
Q
12 0000.000 Q
21 0000.000  Consumer  Surplus  187.5724 
 Social  Welfare  187.5724 
 
In Table 1.5 within network 2 traffic drops respect to Table 1.3 outcome, what is 
explained by the fact that calls benefits comes largely from the calls received and not 
from the calls made, where the calls received are an externality from those who makes 
calls to those who receives them. The consumers freely choose to become subscribers of 
company 2, with asymmetric call patterns within them. In this situation, company 1 is 
out of the market, company 2 profits are cero, and consumer surplus and Social Welfare 
reaches 159.0142. However, as in Table 1.4, in Table 1.6 if the consumers are offered 
the chance only to become members of network 1, by making very expensive to be a 




   17
Now and respect to Table 1.1 parameter values, assume that there is a technical 
innovation in company 2 such that company 2 call termination marginal cost decreases 
from 0.008 to 0.003. With that we have that the cost of calling within network 1 is the 
same as the cost of calling within network 2 (0.005), and is cheaper to call from 
network 2 to network 1 (0.004), than from network 1 to network 2 (0.006). Thus, if 
prices are adjusted to costs, in Table 1.7 we compute model equilibrium when c
2e =  
0.03. Consumers become subscribers of company 2, where Social Welfare reaches 
260.1516. Giving the same outcome as in Table 1.4 where consumers are allowed only 
to become subscribers of company 1. 
 
Thus, under a CPP pricing policy regime, is more convenient for the consumers to 
become subscribers of company 2 because from this company they face the lowest 





2e and in spite of everything is better if the consumers contract 
telecommunication services with company 2. Armstrong (2002) reaches to a result that 
differs from us, where he stays that the 1
rst Best is to have that prices should be set to 
attract consumers to the network with the lowest termination costs, but in our case 
higher efficiency is reached by attracting consumers to the network with the overall 
lower costs.  
 
Table 1.7 
Experiment 1.- Outcome – Technical change 










12  1  I
22  1  I
32  1  I
42  1  π





1 665.6667  C
3
1 665.6667  C
4
1 665.6667  π
2  0.0000 
C
1
3 665.6667  C
2
3 665.6667  C
3





4 665.6667  C
2
4 665.6667  C
3




Network traffic  Surplus 
Q
11 0000.000 Q
22 7,988.000  Producer  surplus  0.0000 
Q
12 0000.000 Q
21 0000.000  Consumer  Surplus  260.1516 
 Social  Welfare  260.1516 
 
3.2.- Experiment 2.- Optimal tariff adjustment 
 
If companies have a fixed cost in which they incur to provide the call origination and/or 
termination service, how we should adjust prices to account for the fixed cost such that 
the companies obtain enough revenues to cover all their costs while achieves higher 
social welfare?
18 To answer this question under different price policies we compute the 
equilibrium using a common parameter values set. Consumers are free to choose if they 
contract telecommunication services with company 1 or company 2. 
 
                                                 
18 We are not looking up for Ramsey formulas that in real situations are difficult to apply because the lack 
of knowledge of demand elasticity. Instead of that, we assess simple and ad-hock tariff adjustment 
criteria’s that has been suggested for Chilean telecommunication tariffs.   18
Table 2.1 present the preference, income, and cost parameter values set that we use for 
this experiment. From consumer preference and income parameter values we have that 
consumers are heterogeneous in terms of their likely of becoming subscribers of 
company 1 or company 2 according to their preference parameter v
i(t),  i =1,…,4, 
t=1,…,T. Thus, in terms of their preference parameter values they perceive network 1 
not as a perfect substitute for network 2. Further, since φ
i
j = 1, i,  j = 1,…,N, the 
consumers only receive utility from the calls that they make but receive no utility from 
the calls that they receive. In terms of the cost structure, each company face a fixed or 
common cost C
1 = C
2 = 1, and are equally efficient in the cost of originating a call c
1o = 
c




ie, i = 1,2. 
 
Table 2.1 
Experiment 2.- Technology and Preference Parameters 
Technology Preferences 
c
1o  0.003  Consumer  1 2 3 4 
c
1e 0.002  v
i1  1.000 0.900 0.800 0.700 
c
2o 0.003  v
i2  0.700 0.800 0.900 1.000 
c
2e 0.002  g
i  0.300 0.300 0.300 0.300 
C
1 1.000  m
i  10.000 10.000 10.000 10.000 
C
2 1.000   φ
1
2  1.000  φ
2
1  1.000  φ
3
1  1.000  φ
4
1  1.000 
     φ
1
3  1.000  φ
2
3  1.000  φ
3
2  1.000  φ
4
2  1.000 
     φ
1
4  1.000  φ
2
4  1.000  φ
3
4  1.000  φ
4
3  1.000 
 
First assume that prices are set equal to marginal costs and for each company is set an 
access charge T
i to account for the fixed or common cost, where T
i is set equal to the 
fixed or common cost of company i divided by company i number of subscribers, 





Experiment 2.- Prices – Adjustment on T
i 
    
P
11 0.0050  =  MgC 
P
12 0.0050  =  MgC 
P
22 0.0050  =  MgC 
P
21 0.0050  =  MgC 
p
1o 0.0030  =  MgC 
p
1e 0.0020  =  MgC 
p
2o 0.0030  =  MgC 
p
2e 0.0020  =  MgC 
T
1 0.5000  =  AFC 
T
2 0.5000  =  AFC 
 
For the pricing policy of Table 2.2, where T
i is adjusted to account for the fixed cost, 
Table 2.3 gives equilibrium outcome. Consumers 1 and 2 become subscribers of 
company 1, while consumers 3 and 4 become subscribers of company 2. 
 
Table 2.3 
Experiment 2.- Outcome - Adjustment on T
i 
        
                                                 
19 A pricing policy like this can emerge as a part of a Competitive Equilibrium, as defined in 2.3, or an 










12  0  I
22  0  I
32  1  I
42  1  π









1 665.6667  π




















Network traffic  Surplus 
Q
11 1264.6667 Q
22 1264.6667  Producer  surplus  0.0000 
Q
12 2529.3333 Q
21 2529.3333  Consumer  Surplus  245.2505 
 Social  Welfare  245.2505 
 
From the equilibrium we have that the consumers that benefit more from 
telecommunication services (consumer 1 in company 1 and consumer 4 in company 2) 
make more calls than those who benefit less from telecommunication services 





21, and because φ
i
j = 1, i, j = 1,…,N, a consumer makes the same 
number of calls to the other consumers with independence of the company in which the 
other has contracted the service. For the equilibrium computed in Table 2.3 companies 
incurs no losses, and consumer surplus equals Social Welfare of 245.2505. 
 
In Table 2.4 we sketch a different price policy regime, where T
1 and p
1e are adjusted to 
account for company 1 fixed or common cost, and T
2 is adjusted to account for 
company 2 fixed or common cost. Company 1 termination charge p
1e is arbitrarily 
increased in 0.00011 above marginal cost, and with that the price to call within 
company 1 network P
11 and to call from company 2 network to company 1 network P
21 
increases in 0.00011 above the respective service marginal cost. Then T
1 is chosen such 
that at the equilibrium company 1 profits are cero. On the other side company 2 access 
price T
2 is set equal to the fixed or common cost of company 2 divided by company 2 
number of subscribers, namely the average fixed cost (AFC). 
 
Table 2.4 





    
P
11 0.00511  >  MgC 
P
12 0.00500  =  MgC 
P
22 0.00500  =  MgC 
P
21 0.00511  >  MgC 
p
1o 0.00300  =  MgC 
p
1e 0.00211  >  MgC 
p
2o 0.00300  =  MgC 
p
2e 0.00200  =  MgC 
T
1 0.30000  <  AFC 
T
2 0.50000  =  AFC 
 
For the pricing policy of Table 2.4, where T
1 and p
1e and T
2 are adjusted to account for 
the fixed costs, Table 2.5 gives equilibrium outcome. Again consumers 1 and 2 become 
subscribers of company 1, while consumers 3 and 4 become subscribers of company 2. 
 
Table 2.5 














12  0  I
22  0  I
32  1  I
42  1  π









1 651.6088  π




















Network traffic  Surplus 
Q
11 1237.9568 Q
22 1264.6667  Producer  surplus  0.0000 
Q
12 2529.3333 Q
21 2475.9135  Consumer  Surplus  245.2463 
 Social  Welfare  245.2463 
 
We have once more from the equilibrium that the consumers that benefit more from 
telecommunication services (consumer 1 in company 1 and consumer 4 in company 2) 
make more calls than those who benefit less from telecommunication services 







j = 1, i, j = 1,…,N, consumer makes different 
numbers of calls to those subscribers that can be reached at a low or a high usage price, 
making less calls to the lasts. For the equilibrium computed in Table 2.5 companies 
incurs no losses, and consumer surplus equals Social Welfare of 245.2463. 
 
Comparing the equilibrium results from Table 2.3 and Table 2.5 we obtain that Social 
Welfare is larger when the revenues required to finance companies fixed or common 
costs are collected by a telecommunication service fixed access charge instead of 
collecting part of the required revenues by increasing the companies termination charge 
p
it above marginal cost. 
 
3.3.- Experiment 3.- Network interconnection charge differences 
transferred to the public 
 
If the companies have different interconnection charges for the use of their network, 
should interconnection charge differences be transferred to the public, or 
interconnection charges should be made equal between the different companies?, and if 
they are made equal, what are the effects of doing them equal to the cost of the company 
with the lowest interconnection cost, or equal to the cost of the company with the 
largest interconnection cost? 
 
To answer this questions and for different interconnection charge policies we compute 
model equilibrium with a particular parameter values set, where the consumers are free 
to choose if they can contract telecommunication services with company 1 or company 
2. These allow us to compare the efficiency properties of the equilibrium under the 
alternative interconnection charge policies. 
 
Table 3.1 
Experiment 3.- Technology and Preference Parameters 
Technology Preferences 
c
1o  0.003  Consumer  1 2 3 4 
c
1e 0.002  v
i1  1.000 0.900 0.800 0.700 
c
2o 0.004  v
i2  0.700 0.800 0.900 1.000 
c
2e 0.003  g
i  0.300 0.300 0.300 0.300 
C
1 1.000  m
i  10.000 10.000 10.000 10.000 
C
2 1.000   φ
1
2  1.000  φ
2
1  1.000  φ
3
1  1.000  φ
4
1  1.000 
     φ
1
3  1.000  φ
2
3  1.000  φ
3
2  1.000  φ
4
2  1.000 
     φ
1
4  1.000  φ
2
4  1.000  φ
3
4  1.000  φ
4
3  1.000 
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Table 3.1 present the preference, income, and cost parameter values set that we use for 
this experiment. From consumer preference and income parameter values we have that 
consumers are heterogeneous in terms of their likely of becoming subscribers of 
company 1 or company 2 according to their preference parameter v
i(t),  i =1,…,4, 
t=1,…,T. Thus, in terms of their preference parameter values they perceive network 1 
not as a perfect substitute for network 2. Further, since φ
i
j = 1, i,  j = 1,…,N, the 
consumers only receive utility from the calls that they make but receive no utility from 
the calls that they receive. In terms of the cost structure, each company face a fixed or 
common cost C
1 = C
2 = 1, and company 1 is more efficient than company 2 in the cost 
of originating a call c
1o < c
2o and in the cost of finishing a call c
1e < c
2e. Further, in each 
company the cost of finishing a call is lower than the cost of originating a call c
ie < c
io, i 
= 1, 2. 
 
As benchmark first we compute equilibrium where interconnection charges are adjusted 
to costs, and where interconnection charge differences are transfer to the public. For this 





























Therefore, for the model parameter values, in Table 3.2 are the prices used for 




Experiment 3.- Prices – Interconnection 
charges adjusted to costs 
    
P
11 0.0050  =  MgC 
P
12 0.0060  =  MgC 
P
22 0.0070  =  MgC 
P
21 0.0060  =  MgC 
p
1o 0.0030  =  MgC 
p
1e 0.0020  =  MgC 
p
2o 0.0040  =  MgC 
p
2e 0.0030  =  MgC 
T
1 0.5000  =  AFC 
T
2 0.5000  =  AFC 
 
For the pricing policy of Table 3.2, where interconnection charges are adjusted to costs, 
Table 3.3 gives equilibrium outcome. Consumers 1 and 2 become subscribers of 
company 1, while consumers 3 and 4 become subscribers of company 2. 
 
Table 3.3 
Experiment 3.- Outcome – Interconnection charges adjusted to costs 










12  0  I
22  0  I
32  1  I
42  1  π









1 554.5556  π




















Network traffic  Surplus 
Q
11 1264.6667 Q
22 902.7619  Producer  surplus  0.0000 
Q
12 2107.1111 Q
21 2107.1111  Consumer  Surplus  238.5127 
 Social  Welfare  238.5127 
 
From the equilibrium we have that the consumers that benefit more from 
telecommunication services (consumer 1 in company 1 and consumer 4 in company 2) 
make more calls than those who benefit less from telecommunication services 





22, and because φ
i
j = 1, i, j = 1,…,N, each consumer makes 
different number of calls to the other consumers depending on the price that she/he 
faces for doing the call, what depends on the interconnection charge paid by one 
company to the other. For the equilibrium computed in Table 3.3 the companies incur 
no losses, and consumer surplus equals Social Welfare of 238.5127. 
 
In Table 3.4 we sketch a different price policy, where company 2 interconnection 
charge p





Since company 2 is providing interconnection to his network at a price that is below the 
marginal cost, is required an increase in the price of other services of the company, 
where arbitrarily we increase T
2 above the average fixed cost until in the equilibrium the 
company 2 cover all his cost. Otherwise company 2 will not be able to operate in the 
market. Other prices are set equal to their marginal costs except for P
12 that decreases 
with p
2e, and with T




Experiment 3.- Prices – Network 2 
interconnection charges below Marginal 
Cost 
    
P
11 0.0050  =  MgC 
P
12 0.0050  <  MgC 
P
22 0.0070  =  MgC 
P
21 0.0060  =  MgC 
p
1o 0.0030  =  MgC 
p
1e 0.0020  =  MgC 
p
2o 0.0040  =  MgC 
p
2e 0.0020  <  MgC 
T
1 0.5000  =  AFC 
T
2 1.76465  >  AFC 
 
For the pricing policy of Table 3.4, where interconnection charge of company 2 is 
below marginal cost, Table 3.5 gives equilibrium outcome. Consumers 1 and 2 become 
subscribers of company 1, while consumers 3 and 4 become subscribers of company 2. 
 
Table 3.5 
Experiment 3.- Outcome– Network 2 interconnection charges below Marginal Cost 









12  0  I
22  0  I
32  1  I
42  1  π









1 554.5556  π




















Network traffic  Surplus 
Q
11 1264.6667 Q
22 902.7619  Producer  surplus  0.0000 
Q
12 2529.3333 Q
21 2107.1111  Consumer  Surplus  238.2888 
 Social  Welfare  238.2888 
 
For the equilibrium computed in Table 3.5 the companies incur no losses, and consumer 
surplus equals Social Welfare of 238.2888, what is below the social welfare that is 
achieved in the previous benchmark case of 238.5127. Thus, in this scenario where we 
set interconnection charges equal to the cost of the company with lowest 
interconnection cost, decreases social welfare even though the telecommunication 
service fixed interconnection charge of the company with higher termination costs is 
increased in a way such that in equilibrium it incur no losses.  
 
In Table 3.6 the price policy is one where company 1 interconnection charge p
1e is set 




1e. Since company 1 
is providing interconnection to his network at a price that is above the marginal cost, the 
price of other services of the company can be decreased, where arbitrarily we decrease 
T
1 below the average fixed cost down to cero, where in equilibrium company 1 still 
obtain strictly positive profits. Other prices are set equal to their marginal costs except 
for p
21 that increases with p
1e, and with T




Experiment 3.- Prices – Network 1 
interconnection charges above Marginal 
Cost 
    
P
11 0.0050  =  MgC 
P
12 0.0060  =  MgC 
P
22 0.0070  =  MgC 
P
21 0.0070  >  MgC 
p
1o 0.0030  =  MgC 
p
1e 0.0030  >  MgC 
p
2o 0.0040  =  MgC 
p
2e 0.0030  =  MgC 
T
1 0.0000  <  AFC 
T
2 0.5000  =  AFC 
 
For the pricing policy of Table 3.6, where interconnection charges of company 1 is 
above marginal cost, Table 3.7 gives equilibrium outcome. Consumers 1 and 2 become 
subscribers of company 1, while consumers 3 and 4 become subscribers of company 2. 
 
Table 3.7 
Experiment 3.- Outcome – Network 1 interconnection charges above Marginal Cost 










12  0  I
22  0  I
32  1  I
42  1  π









1 475.1905  π




















Network traffic  Surplus   24
Q
11 1264.6667 Q
22 902.7619  Producer  surplus  0.8055 
Q
12 2107.1111 Q
21 1805.5238  Consumer  Surplus  238.3697* 
 Social  Welfare  238.3697 
Consumer surplus accounts for the dividends received from the companies profits. Without dividends, 
consumer surplus reaches 237.5642 
 
For the equilibrium computed in Table 3.7 company 1 obtain positive profits, company 
2 incur no losses, and consumer surplus plus company 1 profits gives Social Welfare of 
238.3697, what is below the Social Welfare that is achieved in the benchmark case of 
238.5127, but above Social Welfare of 238.2888 achieved in the previous case where 




In this paper we develop a General Equilibrium model where agents choose the 
telecommunication company and the number of calls they made to other subscribers. 
The consumers benefit from the calls that they do but also from the calls they receive. 
Based on equilibrium properties and with numerical experiments under specific 
parameter values sets we address three important questions that continuously appear in 
the debate about interconnection charges: consumers network choice will lead to an 
optimal development of the industry?; if telecommunication companies confront a fixed 
or common cost, what price adjustment gives a larger social welfare?; when the 
regulator calculates termination or interconnection charges into the different 
telecommunication networks, the interconnection charges should be equal or different 
for the different networks?, and if they are different, what are the effects that the 
differences in interconnection charges are or not transfer to the public or final user? 
 
First, we obtain that social and private incentives may go in different directions, 
implying that competitive equilibrium may lead to an inefficient network selection and 
an inefficient resource allocation. That is, agents’ network decision leads to an 
inefficient industry structure because they competitively chose a network that from a 
social point of view is an inferior one. Second, we find that Social Welfare is larger 
when the revenues required to finance companies fixed or common costs are collected 
by a fixed access charge instead of collecting part of the required revenues by increasing 
the companies’ interconnection charge above marginal cost. If telecommunication 
companies faces a fixed or common cost, becomes of higher efficient to finance this 
cost through a fixed access charge on the telephone line, setting telecommunication 
companies interconnection charges equal to each company interconnection marginal 
cost, where policies that finance fixed or common costs by increasing interconnection 
charges above marginal costs lead to a less efficient allocation than policies where 
telecommunication companies interconnection charges is set equal to the 
interconnection marginal cost, of the company with the highest or lowest 
interconnection marginal cost. Finally and third, for the equilibrium computed if the 
companies’ interconnection costs are different, efficiency calls to set interconnection 
charges equal to each company interconnection marginal cost and to transfer 
interconnection charge differences to the public. 
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